The tests are compiled without -D_GNU_SOURCE, therefore
the XSI version of strerror_r is used. Defining
_GNU_SOURCE in torture.h then including *.c gives error
because it is assuming GNU version of strerror_r in
the source file.
Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Fix#98 by adding 'ssh_session_set_disconnect_message' Whenever the ssh
session disconnects a "Bye Bye" message was set and displayed. Now the
peer has a choice to set a customised message to be sent after the
session is disconnected. The default "Bye Bye" will be set if this
function is not called or not called correctly. The testcases in
tests/server/torture_server can also demonstrate how this function
works.
Signed-off-by: Om Sheladia <omsheladia10@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Contaminated errno can happen before strtoul call, thereofore
cleaning it before the call.
The errno is not used for checking later in code if fail happens,
therefore cleaning it right after error.
Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
The cmocka captures all signals so I was not able to reproduce the code
path. But leaving the code in for future readers.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Added API function ssh_channel_open_forward_port that is the same as
ssh_channel_accept_forward with the addition to determine the
originator address and port
Signed-off-by: Tomas Holmqvist <tomhol@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Thanks to Harry Sintonen from WithSecure for pointing this out.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Thanks to Harry Sintonen from WithSecure for pointing this out.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Thanks to Harry Sintonen from WithSecure for pointing this out.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
The original key had 2018 bits, which falls short for current security
requirements
Steps I used:
$ ssh-keygen -f tests/keys/certauth/id_rsa -t rsa -b 2048 -C libssh_torture_auth -N ''
$ ssh-keygen -s tests/keys/user_ca -I torture_auth_carlos -n alice ./tests/keys/certauth/id_rsa.pub
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Remove config options: protocol, mac, cipher, compressionlevel,
gssapikeyexchange,
gssapirenewalforcesrekey,
gssapitrustdns,
rhostsrsaauthentication,
rsaauthentication,
useprivilegedport,
pubkeyacceptedtypes
since they are not supported by OpenSSH
Rename some config options:
hostbasedkeytypes, challengeresponseauthentication and pubkeyacceptedkeytypes
to hosbasedacceptedalgorithms, kdbinteractiveauthentication and pubkeyacceptedalgorithms
to be consistent with the OpenSSH manual https://man.openbsd.org/sshd_config.
Keep pubkeyacceptedkeytypes for backward compatibility.
Rename SOC_PUBKEYACCEPTEDTYPES to SOC_PUBKEYACCEPTEDKEYTYPES in config.h
Update unittests/torture_config.c and unittests/torture_options.c
Signed-off-by: Anh Minh Tran <anhminh@seznam.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
The libssh versions before this included files with relative path based
on the current working directory, which can result unexpected results
and is different from the OpenSSH include behavior. The manual page for
ssh_config lists:
> iles without absolute paths are assumed to be in ~/.ssh if included in
> a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if included from the system
> configuration file.
This is following the semantics as close as possible with a difference
that we do not use the hardcoded ~/.ssh for user configuration files,
but the path defined with SSH_OPTIONS_SSH_DIR, which is already used
to reference any other files in used home directory.
Fixes#93
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
In certificate authentication with OpenSSH 8.0, the SHA2 signatures were
not accepted correctly [1]. This was not an issue up until the OpenSSH
8.8p1, which does no longer allow SHA1 signatures by default so this
broke the CI and tests against the new OpenSSH [2].
Fixes!107
[1] https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3016
[2] https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Currently Compression=no (the default) force-disables zlib algos, while
Compression=yes force-enables it. This means that mismatching options between
client and server lead to connection failure. This can easily happen if the
server has default settings but the client specifies Compression=yes.
OpenSSH treats the option as a "prefer compression" setting:
Compression=no -> none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib (default)
Compression=yes -> zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none
This commit changes the libssh behaviour to the same as OpenSSH.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Vogt <fabian@ritter-vogt.de>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Do not compile tests which need SSHD_EXECUTABLE when
it is not available
Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Calling some channel procedures on a freed channel is always resulting
in segmentation fault errors. The reason is that when a channel is
freed with 'ssh_channel_do_free' procedure, its 'session' field is set
to NULL; then when a channel procedure tries to access any field of
'channel->session' structure it is effectively dereferencing a NULL
pointer.
The change fixes that behavior by adding a check which ensures that a
channel state is not SSH_CHANNEL_FLAG_FREED_LOCAL before accessing its
parent session.
Also the test suite is updated to check for the fixed errors, and the
Doxygen documentation updated accordingly.
There was a bug introduced in b0fb7d15: 'ssh_channel_poll',
'ssh_channel_poll_timeout' and 'ssh_channel_get_exit_status' would
compare the channel state to the 'SSH_CHANNEL_FLAG_FREED_LOCAL'
constant to check if the channel is alive. But the procedures must
check the channel flags for the presence of
'SSH_CHANNEL_FLAG_FREED_LOCAL' bits instead. This change fixes the
bug.
Signed-off-by: Artyom V. Poptsov <poptsov.artyom@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
We do not use SHA1 as it is disabled in many systems
Verifies CVE-2021-3634
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Normally, the length of session_id and secret_hash is the same,
but if we will get into rekeying with a peer that changes preference
of key exchange algorithm, the new secret hash can be larger or
smaller than the previous session_id causing invalid reads or writes.
Resolves https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=35485
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
This adds a test to check if the internal implementation is not used
when it is not supposed to be used.
To be able to override functions using LD_PRELOAD, a shared version of
the torture library was added, as well as a shared library for each
of the algorithms implemented internally (ChaCha20, Poly1305,
curve25519, and ed25519).
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
The test for delayed close asks for the execution of a command that
generates big output (larger than the default window) to make data to
remain in buffers while the close message arrives, triggering the
delayed channel closure.
Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Another item identified during code review was cases where the return
value of ssh_list_new() was not properly checked and handled. This
updates all cases that were missing this to handle failure to allocate a
new list.
Signed-off-by: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
These calls can fail and the return code should always be checked. These
issues were identified when code review called it out on new code. The
updates here are to existing code with no behavior changes to make
review simpler.
Signed-off-by: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
In https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/145#note_463232084
behavior in libssh was identified where it diverges from how for example
OpenSSH behaves. In OpenSSH if a request success of failure message is
received, apart from it being treated as a keepalive message, it is
ignored otherwise.
Libssh does handle the unexpected message and triggers an error
condition internally. This means that with the Dropbear behavior where
it replies to a hostkeys-00@openssh.com message even with a want_reply
= 0 (arguably a bug), libssh enters an error state.
This change makes the libssh behavior match OpenSSH to ignore these
messages. The spec is a bit unclear on whether Dropbear is buggy here or
not, but let's be liberal with the input accepted here in libssh.
Signed-off-by: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
These are disabled in latest since Dropbear 2020.79, while
older do not support anything better than aes-ctr ciphers.
We should implement some dynamic algorithm detection for dropbear
too to increase test coverage.
https://bugs.libssh.org/T252
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
This adds an initial test with all AEAD modes to verify that they work
if there is no overlap in HMAC ciphers.
Signed-off-by: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
